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ILLINOIS CONCEPTS CONCERNING JOINDER
OF ,PARTIES AND CAUSES
W. F. Zacharias*

A

PERSON

ENGAGED

in writing a history of Anglo-American

procedural law would undoubtedly have cause to remark
that some of the most startling of its developments had their
inception in the simplest of fashions. Who, for example, would
have supposed that, out of the common grain transaction between
the farmer and the buyer involved in Slade's Case,' there would
eventually evolve that judicially created and conveniently enforced
fiction known as the implied in law, or quasi, contract? Other
instances, each remarkable in itself, would fill the record. But
it would seem, from the outcome of the recent Illinois case of
Johnson v. Moon,2 that the day of the judicially-made innovation
in procedural law has not yet disappeared. Highway accidents,
even those involving multiple parties and multiple vehicles, are
not so uncommon that it would be supposed that, from a highway
collision which occurred in 1950, new principles with respect to
joinder of parties and causes would be created. Nevertheless,
judging from the outcome of the case in question, that is exactly
what has been brought about.
To detail the facts of the case briefly, a passenger car operated
on an Illinois highway by a James George Moon collided with
a moving loaded tractor-trailer, resulting in Moon's death. The
evidence at the ensuing coroner's inquest appeared to disclose
that the tractor-trailer was driven by Philip K. Saxton; that
Virgil and Kenneth Johnson owned part of the equipment; that
Illinois license plates on both tractor and trailer had been issued
to Safeway Truck Lines, Inc., and that the load had been picked
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
14 Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
23 Ill. (2d) 561, 121 N. E. (2d) 774 (1954), reversing 1 Ill. App. (2d) 6, 116 N. E.
(2d) 95 (1953).
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up in Iowa, from a customer of the last named firm, for transportation in interstate commerce. Saxton had also there testified
that his immediate employer was Virgil Johnson.
The litigated case began,3 in common-place fashion, with a
tort suit by Virgil Johnson, claiming to be the "owner and occupant and driver," against Moon's legal representative, to recover
for damage done to the tractor-trailer. A normal defense to that
suit, aside from the usual issues as to negligence, contributory
negligence, and proximate cause, might have been based on the
idea that the plaintiff could not succeed, at least as to part of
the claim, for he was neither "owner" nor "driver" of the
equipment' and, except as the term "occupant" might be construed to be the equivalent of "bailee," 5 the plaintiff possessed no
basis for asserting a claim which, if one existed, belonged to
another. 6
Nevertheless, the attorney for the legal representative,
apparently motivated by the idea that the best -defense is often
an offensive one, petitioned the court for leave to make Saxton,
Kenneth Johnson, and Safeway Truck Lines, Inc., additional
parties to the suit and, along with the original plaintiff, named
them as cross-defendants to a counterclaim then filed. Under this
counterclaim, recovery was sought for Moon's alleged wrongful
death7 against all of the parties on the theory that Saxton, as
driver, was the employee of "one, some or all" of the other crossdefendants and was, at the time, acting within the scope of his
employment. Permission to that end having been granted, an
s It might be worthy of note that the suit was instituted slightly more than two
months after the accident.
4 This defense would, of course, have proceeded on the familiar idea that a variance between pleading and proof would require a verdict for the defendant.
5 As to the right of a bailee to sue for recovery of damage done to the bailed
articles, see Walsh v. U. S. Tent & Awning Co., 153 Ill. App. 229 (1910).
6 The suit did not appear to be one by Johnson as assignee, for the complaint did
not contain those allegations with respect to an assignment made necessary by
Section 22 of the Civil Practice Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 146.
7 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1 et seq.
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additional summons was issued8 and service was obtained.' The
trucking company so added filed a general appearance and an
answer 0 but later moved, before another judge, 1 for permission
to withdraw its answer and to dismiss the counterclaim. This
relief was granted by the trial court and the Appellate Court for
the First District affirmed this ruling, the court taking the position
that there was no authority, in a law action of the type before it,
for the use of anything like the joinder practice there attempted.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, following the granting of
leave to appeal,' 2 reversed both the lower courts and allowed the
original defendant to proceed as planned under an epoch-making
decision which, despite a conscious effort to ground the opinion
on language in the Illinois Civil Practice Act, represents about
as neat a piece of judicial fabrication of procedural law as was
ever -achieved in Anglo-American history.
I.

PRIOR PRACTICE IN LAw ACTIONS

Leaving aside any question concerning the power of the court
to adopt a specific rule dealing with the subject, 18 it would be
helpful to an understanding of the Johnson decision to review
in some detail the prior concepts deemed to be controlling in the
8 Ibid.,

Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
9 As Saxton and Kenneth Johnson were alleged to be non-residents, service was
had on them pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 951A, § 23. They did not
formally appear to take part in any of the subsequent proceedings, but Safeway
Truck Lines, Inc., did request dismissal of the counterclaim as to them at the time
it sought similar relief for itself and they were dismissed from the suit. It is
questionable, however, whether one defendant may urge objections which should
properly come from another defendant: Plummer v. People, 16 Il1. 358 (1855).
10 It would seem that a special appearance and a motion to dismiss the counterclaim would have been more appropriate: Clay County Land Co. v. Alcox, 88 Minn.
4, 92 N. W. 464 (1902).
11 It was argued on appeal that this judge lacked authority to overrule his
predecessor's action, but it was held otherwise: Johnson v. Moon, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 6,
116 N. E. (2d) 95 (1953). The Supreme Court agreed with the views there
expressed.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
13 The Illinois Supreme Court, like most other American courts, has done very
little by way of affirmative act to regulate procedural matters, having been generally content to leave the matter of law revision in the hands of the legislature.
As to the power of courts to adopt rules and to make the same binding upon
litigants, see Feldott v. Featherstone, 290 Ill. 485, 125 N. E. 361 (1919) ; Kelley v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 275 Ill. App. 112 (1934).
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disposition of multiple claims between multiple parties within the
framework of one suit. It had, at a very early date, once been
the English view that a law suit should serve as a medium for
the disposition of but a single legal claim and then usually as
between a single plaintiff and a single defendant. 14 This view
has been ascribed to an overweening concern that a jury composed of laymen would become confused if they were asked to
consider and arrive at a verdict upon multiple issues, even though
the same arose between the two parties. 15 There is some occasion to believe, however, that at the outset and with royal revenue
at stake, since the issuance of each new writ produced additional
revenue for the treasury, 16 the English judges would quite naturally develop a procedural system favoring the idea of separate
suits for separate demands.'
The only deviation then permitted, one tending to increase
the number of parties but not to increase the issues, would be
one to the effect that, in the event the claim was a joint one, being
in favor of more than one promisee or obligee' s or arose from
a duty owed by more than one promisor or obligor, 9 the joint
owners were obliged to join in the suit as plaintiffs or the action
had to include the joint defendants under penalty of dismissal
14 The suit at law had, of course, to be conducted by the person having the legal
title to the claim and be directed against one who had breached a legal duty as a
court of law could take cognizance only of legal matters: Cbadsey v. Lewis, 6 Ill.
(1 Gil.) 153 (1844). Development of an objection based on the ground of misjoinder was a necessary counterpart to the concept mentioned: Snell v. DeLand,
43 Ill. 323 (1867).
15 Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective (National
Conference of Judicial Councils, New York, 1952), p. 8, notes that, in the infancy
of procedure, the mechanism is "always so contrived as to confine the task of the
deciding power, as far as possible, to the determination of a single question."
16 Each time the litigant procured a new writ he was forced to pay for the same:
Millar, op. cit., p. 17.
17 The requirement that the plaintiff should give the one best statement of his
claim and the defendant be required to rely on the one best defensive plea, thereby
promoting a singleness of issue, was a by-product of this view. See Shipman,
Handbook of Common Law Pleading (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1923), p. 418.
Justification for the view was said to rest on the premise that if the best statement
was not good enough, anything less than the best would be obviously insufficient.
18 International Hotel Co. v. Flynn, 238 Il1. 636, 87 N. E. 855 (1909), reversing
141 Ill. App. 532 (1908); Archer v. Bogue, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 526 (1842); Connolly
v. Cottle, 1 Ill. (Beecher's Breese) 364 (1830).
19 Page v. Brant, 18 Ill. 37 (1856).
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of the suit if a nonjoinder had occurred. 0 This view led, in
fairly natural sequence, to the idea that, in the event a tort had
been committed, while the joint owners of the claim were still
required to be plaintiffs, 21 the wrongdoers whose fault had concurred in the commission of the harm could be treated as joint
tort feasors if the plaintiff so elected 2 but a suit might be maintained against any one of them alone if the injured person so
preferred.
Within this rigid framework, as then established,
there was little opportunity to use a law suit as a vehicle to try
out multiple issues between multiple parties.
Insofar as joinder of claims was concerned, the common law
practice was equally restrained 24 but hardships ascribed to the
difficulty attendant upon the selection of the one true basis for
a claim, or for the presentation of the one best defense, eventually
forced recognition of the doctrine that a pleader should be entitled
20 The cases of International Hotel Co. v. Flynn, 238 Ill. 636, 87 N. E. 855 (1909),
and Snell v. DeLand, 43 Ill. 323 (1867), illustrate the former practice on the point.
21 C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Todd, 91 Ill. 70 (1878). Failure on the part of all
of the joint owners to combine in the suit was, however, open to objection only by
plea in abatement: Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 302 (1855) ; Edwards v. Hill,
11 Ill. 22 (1849). The combination of two or more persons in one suit, each having
a separate tort claim against the defendant, even when the one wrongful act had
violated all of the separate rights at the same time and in the same fashion,
amounted to a misjoinder: Hennies v. Vogel, 66 Ill. 401 (1872).
22 At one time, only those who acted in concert with one another to perpetrate
the tort could be considered to be joint tort feasors: Nicoll v. Glennie, 1 Maule &
S. 588, 105 Eng. Rep. 220 (1813); Chamberlain v. White, Cro. Jac. 647, 79 Eng.
Rep. 558 (1622). No attempt has been made to trace the several enlargements
which have been made on this doctrine, principally brought about because of the
difficulty experienced by a plaintiff in establishing the precise harms inflicted by
each of the several actors who may have concurred in the ultimate result. It is
now generally possible to combine a number of persons under the guise of their
being joint tort feasors even though each may have acted independently of the
others and may have breached an entirely different duty: Nordhaus v. Vandalia
R. R. Co., 242 Ill. 166, 89 N. E. 974 (1909).
23 In Tandrup v. Sampsell, 234 Ill. 526 at 530, 85 N. E. 331 at 332, 17 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 852 (1908), the court said: "Every person who joins in committing a tort
is severally liable for it, and cannot escape liability by showing that another is
liable also; nor can one of a number of tort feasors compel the plaintiff to sue him
jointly with other persons with whom he has joined in committing the tort." The
court noted the possibility of certain exceptions, as where the tort grows out of the
ownership of land held jointly or where the nature of the wrong, such as slander or
seduction, cannot be committed by more than one person, but continued: "Subject
to these exceptions, the general rule may be stated to be, that a plea in abatement
for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties defendant in an action in tort is never
proper, nor can the objection be otherwise successfully interposed."
24 See note 17, ante.
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to urge more than one basis for his claim or defense. 5 Even so,
the requirement with respect to singleness of issue, and its countering fault of duplicity, 26 was said to make it necessary that the
27
several variations of the one case be stated in separate counts,
as if they represented truly separate suits, 2s and the several
defenses had to be set up in separate pleas. 2 In that event, it
was necessary to give close attention to these separate lines of
pleading to avoid the confusion which would otherwise be inherent
therein."0
From this point it was not difficult to eventually reach the
result that, in the event a given plaintiff had not one but several
distinct claims or demands against the same defendant, he should
25 The right to use plural pleas was not given statutory recognition until the
enactment of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16 (1705). Prior to that time a defendant could rely
on two or more facts only If the same, put together, constituted a single defense:
Dame Audley's Case, Moore 25, 72 Eng. Rep. 416 (1561). The plaintiff appears to
have been favored, before that time, by tacit permission for the use of several
counts to set forth variant statements of the same one case: Stephens, Pleading
(Tyler's Ed.), p. 258.
26 Duplicity or double pleading, i. e., the stating of two or more grounds in support of the same demand or the same defense when either would be sufficient for
the purpose, was considered a vice not only because it would be conducive to
multiple issues, thereby tending to confuse the jury who might be unable to keep
their minds on any great variety of matters, but also because the plural issues
raised might have to be submitted to different tribunals in case one ground generated an issue of law and the other an issue of fact. In the latter case, opposing
decisions might be reached, making it impossible to dispose of the point: Hooker
v. Nye, 1 C., M., & R. 258, 149 Eng. Rep. 1077 (1834).
27 See, for example, Hart v. Longfield, 7 Mod. 148, 87 Eng. Rep. 1156 (1703),
where the plaintiff, in one count, failed in an attempt to recover in general
assumpsit in reliance upon an indebitatus asmlmpsit claim based on performance of
an express contract to pay a precise sum while also seeking to recover, as on
quantum meruit, for the reasonable value of the same services as if performed
under an implied contract. See also Fisher, "The Persistence of Chitty," 6 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1939), particularly pp. 365-9.
28 In Hart v. Longfield, 7 Mod. 148, 87 Eng. Rep. 1156 (1703), Chief Justice Holt
advised the plaintiff to "aver them to be different children . . . For here you ought
to multiply Edward Longfield [the defendant] as often as you multiply your
declaration." It would follow from this that a court would disregard inconsistency
between the counts, as if the judge wore blinders which prevented his eyes from
straying across lines, although the same error within the framework of a single
count would be considered fatal: Keeshan v. Elgin A. & S. Traction Co., 132 Ill.
App. 416 (1907).
29 See L., N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 169 Ill. 247, 48 N. E. 402 (1897), where
a single plea was held bad because it contained two distinct matters, either of
which would serve to bar the action.
s0 The case of Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N. E. 940. 14 Am. Cas. 340
(1908), would Indicate that separate replications were needed in the event the
defendant had used plural pleas, particularly so if the response to one defense was
in the form of a traverse and the other rested in confession and avoidance.
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be permitted to assert the same in one suit if he so desired 1
but subject to the general qualification that he recognize he was
presenting compound claims by being obliged to separate the
same into an appropriate series of counts, each being confined
for use in relation to a single claim.3 2 Naturally, since the writ
system still prevailed, the several claims so combined had to be
of the same general nature for it would have been considered
highly irregular to join unlike claims or claims falling beyond
the limit of the writ which formed the basic jurisdictional foundation for the suit. 33 Such being the case, a plaintiff would not
have been permitted to combine claims arising from contracts
35
with those based in tort34 but he could unite a series of contract
or tort3" claims in one suit, so long as the same were directed
against the one defendant or were jointly directed against a
31 In Godfrey v. Buckmaster, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 447 at 450 (1838), it was held
proper for a plaintiff, possessed of six notes executed by the same defendant, to
combine his claims in one count, the court saying: "Indeed it Is most desirable,
where it can be done without producing confusion . . . that this mode of declaring
should be adopted." See also Chicago West Division Ry. Co. v. Ingraham, 131 Ill.
659, 23 N. E. 350 (1890), as to the right of a plaintiff to combine claims for personal injury and property damage in one count where the injury to each occurred
at the same time and by the one negligent act on the defendant's part. Conceding
that the several injuries so far constituted distinct causes of action that separate
suits might have been maintained thereon, the court said: ". . . we are unable to
perceive any reason . . . [why] they may not be joined in the same count of the
declaration." 131 Ill. 659 at 665, 23 N. E. 350 at 351.
32 In the event separate counts were used, each was required to be complete in
itself, as If pleaded alone, unless matter in one count was adopted in another by
appropriate reference: L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N. E. 905
(1894) ; Porter v. Drennan, 13 Ill. App. 362 (1883).
33 Millar, op. cit., p. 111, states: "According to the rule of the common law,
joinder of causes of action was limited to the case where all fell within the same
form of action, with the two exceptions, accounted for historically, that detinue
might be joined with debt and trover with trespass on the case." Other modifications were developed by statute or by judicial decision. Thus, under Barker v.
Koozier, 80 11. 205 (1875), it was permissible to combine counts in trespass and in
trespass on the case despite common law distinctions existing between the two
remedies. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953. Vol. 2, Ch. 119, § 18, authorizes what is essentially a
combination of replevin and trover. See also Sutherland, "Joinder of Actions," 18
Mich. L. Rev. 571 (1920). The defendant was, of course, furnished with the basis
for a demurrer if a misjoinder of claims had, in fact, been produced: Selby v.
Hutchinson, 9 Ill. (4 Gil.) 319 (1847).
34 McDermott v. Morris Canal Co., 38 N. J. L. 53 (1875) : Bull v. Matthews, 20
R. I. 100, 37 A. 336 (1897).
35 Godfrey v. Buckmaster, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 447 (1838).
But note the holding in
T. W. & W. R. Co. v. Depot Building Co., 63 Ill. 308 (1872), to the effect that a
misjoinder would exist if the plaintiff, in one count, sued for damages arising from
a breach of contract and, under a second count, sought to recover for an Improper
recision thereof.
36 Chicago West Division Ry. Co. v. Ingraham, 131 Ill. 659, 23 N. E. 350 (1890);
Barker v. Koozier, 80 i. 205 (1875).
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group of defendants who had, in the fashion noted, been properly included in the one suit. The common law joinder doctrines
mentioned were also complicated by the requirement that the
several claims asserted should be held by the plaintiff in but one
capacity or reach the defendants in the same, and not different
capacities. In the light thereof, a plaintiff was not allowed to
combine a claim on a note payable to plaintiff as an individual
with one on a note payable to or held by him as the legal representative of the estate of another,3 7 nor was the plaintiff allowed
to reach the defendant or defendants in a capacity other than
the one in which such parties had been sued.3
While the later common law system could be said to have
made some progress in the matter of joinder of parties and claims
without any apparent confusion of jurors, the rather illiberal
limits mentioned, affording the plaintiff with a degree of selectivity in the presentation of his claims, was entirely of the permissive character under which it was left to the plaintiff to make
a choice, where choice was possible, at his election. If the plaintiff preferred to present his multiple demands in separate suits,
his decision was not subject to control by the court or his oppoment, even though the result of the choice might mean considerable
inconvenience, waste of judicial time, and multiplication of
expense.
Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant, the common
law procedural concepts were even more rigid for, in the earlier
days, a defendant who held counter-demands against a plaintiff
was generally obliged to retain the same to form the basis of his
own later suit and was not permitted to have refuge therein unless
an account had been stated between the parties.3 9 Two general
exceptions did later arise. Under one of them, designated as
recoupment, a defendant might have the benefit of his counterHally v. Tipping, 3 Wils. K. B. 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 933 (1770).
Sleeper v. Banquet Hall Co., 166 I1. 57, 46 N. E. 782 (1897).
39 The ancient remedies of account and account render are illustrated in the cases
of Garrity v. Hamburger Co., 136 II. 499, 27 N. E. 11 (1891), and Pardridge v.
Ryan, 134 Ill. 247, 25 N. E. 627 (1890).
3T
38
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demand, within appropriate limits, 40 but only to the extent that
he might thereby minimize the plaintiff's recovery to the point
of its total extinction for the defendant could gain nothing
affirmative therefrom even though his damages exceeded the
amount proved up by the plaintiff.41 The other, stemming from
equitable doctrines which had been made applicable to law actions
by statute, 42 classified as a set-off, permitted the defendant to
assert his cross-demand, with the possibility of securing affirmative relief in a proper case, but again only provided the counterdemand possessed recognizable characteristics.4 8 When so used,
44
the set-off had to be mutual, i. e., based on a claim existing
between the plaintiff, or plaintiffs if several persons had been
properly joined, in the capacity in which the suit had been instituted as well as owned by the defendant, or defendants, in the
capacity in which they had been sued.4 5 It could, therefore, run
only between parties already before the court,40 hence could not
be used as a vehicle to bring in any additional parties for this
would, in the eyes of common law judges, have produced a confusion beyond all resolution. It goes without saying that, in
40 A recouping demand could be utilized only when the same arose from the
transaction or contract upon which the plaintiff based his cause of action. It was
not necessary, however, that the defendant's demand be of the same character as
that urged by the plaintiff, nor need the amount thereof be liquidated: Stow v.
Yarwood, 14 Il. 423 (1853).
41 Shipman, op. cit., p. 365, lists a number of earlier Illinois cases on the point.
Except as the demand might be offered against an assignee, in which case see the
decision in Seibert v. Dunn, 216 N. Y. 237, 110 N. E. 447 (1915), the counter-demand
would be exhausted if offered for purpose of recoupment with no opportunity to
recover any unused balance by a later action. The principle against splitting a
cause of action would control: Harpstrite v. Vasel, 3 Ill. App. 121 (1878).
42 The limited degree of set-off permitted by 4 Anne, c. 17, § 11 (1705), in suits
brought by insolvents, was amplified by 2 Geo. II, c. 22, § 13 (1729), and 8 Geo. II,
c. 24 (1735), to extend to all suits at law based on mutual debts.
43 A set-off was available only in the event the plaintiff sued in either debt, covenant, or assumpsit for the non-payment of money, and then only provided the
defendant's demand, which had to arise from another independent transaction, was
of liquidated character: Kingman v. Draper, 14 Ill. App. 577 (1884).
44 On the subject of the right to buy up claims for use by way of set-off, see
Ransom v. Jones, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 291 (1836). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 83, § 18, as to the right to use, by way of set-off, a claim which would be barred
by limitation if made the basis of a separate suit.
45 Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N. E. 940, 14 Am. Cas. 340 (1908) ; International Bank v. Jones, 119 Ill. 407, 9 N. E. 885 (1887) ; Stinson v. Gould, 74 Ill. 80
(1874).
46 A set-off as against the real party in interest could be utilized, even when the
person suing was a nominal plaintiff and the real party was not before the court:
Engs v. Matson, 11 Ill. App. 639 (1882).
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this stage of the law, anything like the procedural steps taken
and approved in the Johnson case would have been open to the
most violent criticism.

II.

PRIOR PRACTICE IN

EQuITy

While the aforementioned procedural devices were being
developed in the common law courts of England, a somewhat
parallel system was arising in the English Court of Chancery
for use in conjunction with equitable proceedings. Not being
hampered by the artificial technicalities of the writ system, nor
concerned with alleged problems as to the necessity for simplicity
of issues to prevent confusion of jurors, the chancellors had
devised a procedural system derived to some extent from Roman
origins and one which possessed a much larger degree of flexibility.4 7

Proceeding from the basis that equity should, so far

as possible, provide complete relief, all persons materially interested in the dispute4 8 were considered eligible to become parties
thereto to the end that the decree might bind all. In that connection, parties to equitable proceedings, whether complainants
or defendants, were usually classified under the headings of
indispensable parties, necessary parties, and formal or proper
parties 49 and any objection based on either a misjoinder or a
nonjoinder was treated in the light thereof.
Indispensable parties, of course, were those whose interests
in the subject matter were so intimately connected that it would
be inequitable, in fact a violation of due process requirements, if
a decree were to be entered dealing with the subject matter or
47 In general, see Millar, op. cit., pp. 23-6.
48 It followed from this that one who had no interest, equitable or otherwise,
should neither serve as complainant or be made a party defendant, being a stranger
to the dispute: Smith v. Hollenback, 46 Ill. 252 (1867). This would be true in the
event the nominal complainant served as the legal representative for a person
under disability. If the latter was the actual owner of the equitable cause of action,
the suit had to be prosecuted in the incapacitated party's name although actually
managed by the legal representative: Hoare v. Harris, 11 Ill. 24 (1849). See also
Marsh v. Green, 79 Ill. 385 (1875), on the point of including a party against whom
no relief was sought.
49 Clephane. Handbook of the Law of Equity Pleading and Practice (West Publishing Co.. St. Paul, 1926), pp. 20-48.
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affecting their rights therein without their presence before the
court. Simple illustrations with respect thereto may be found,
for example, in cases designed to set aside deeds of conveyance,
in which proceedings the grantors, if living, or if not, all of the
grantors' heirs at law, would be essential parties ;50 or, in a suit
to procure recission of a joint contract, all the joint contracting
parties would be required." If the decree would not affect the
person's rights, as would be the case where a senior mortgage
claim would remain undisturbed despite a foreclosure of a junior
lien, such person could be safely omitted. 2
Necessary parties 3 were considered as being those who had
an interest in the controversy which the court ought to pass upon
in order to do complete justice but whose interests, being separable,
could be left undisturbed by the decree rendered between the indispensable litigants. If such persons were available, it was desirable that they should be included in the proceeding to avoid the
necessity of further litigation, 54 but a number of exceptions were
engrafted on the rule as to joinder. If, for example, one of the
necessary parties was outside the jurisdiction, so control could
not be obtained over him, the matter might proceed as to those
present to avoid a denial of justice, 55 provided explanation was
given for the omission. In much the same way, thanks to the
principle of representation, it was possible to dispense with the
necessity for including a large class of persons, particularly if
their names were unknown and could not be ascertained, even
though they might be affected by the proceedings,5 6 especially
57
where a representative of the class had been included as a party.
50 Nolan v. Barnes, 268 Ill. 515, 109 N. E. 316 (1915).

51 Wortham v. Quait, 215 Ill. App. 444 (1919). For other illustrations, see Conway
v. Sexton, 243 Ill. 59, 90 N. E. 203 (1909), an election contest, and Granquist v.
Western Tube Co., 240 Ill. 132, 88 N. E. 468 (1909), a mechanic's lien proceeding.
52 Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 Ill. 367 (1849).
53 The choice of terminology was unfortunate, as "necessary" and "indispensable"
would, to many minds, appear to possess the same meaning. The terms have, however, come to possess distinct meanings for this purpose.
54 Walters v. Walters, 132 Ill. 467, 23 N. E. 1120 (1890).
55 Smith v. Rotan, 44 Ill. 506 (1867).
56 Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160 (1873). But see Thickson v. Barry, 138 Ill. App.
100 (1907).
57 Sturgeon v. Burrell, 1 Ill. App. 537 (1877).
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One other exception might be noted. It came into play when the
interest of the alleged necessary party was so small as to be
practically worthless.58 In that event, pursuant to the doctrine
de minimis non cwrat lex, such person could be omitted without
penalty.
Formal parties, sometimes designated as proper parties, on
the other hand, were those in whose favor or against whom no
decree was sought and who had no direct interest in the controversy, severable or otherwise, but whose inclusion in the case
might be considered desirable, as where they might be possessed
of knowledge with respect to the subject matter of the suit which
might be extracted under discovery process. In that connection,
it might be noted that an assignor of a claim for mechanic's lien
could serve as a formal party complainant although the proceeding was designed to enforce the rights of the assignee5 9 Conversely, one who refused to accept appointment as a successortrustee, and against whom no relief was sought because of such
refusal, could safely be omitted from proceedings instituted by
the trust beneficiaries. ° Inasmuch as failure to join such parties
would not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed, no objection could be made if they were omitted. It likewise followed
that, if they were joined, no objection could be asserted for an
alleged misjoinder.
Inasmuch as the classification of parties in equity proceedings was different from the one adopted in law actions, it quite
early became a matter of indifference, in equity, whether the
parties were correctly and neatly aligned as complainants or
defendants on distinct sides of the proceeding, the more important
point being that all litigants over whom jurisdiction should be
exercised should be brought under the control of the chancellor.
Unlike the rule which prevailed at law, therefore, it was possible
to place one who probably should have been a complainant but who
Burnham v. Roth, 244 Ill. 344, 91 N. E. 472 (1910).
59 Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co. v. Batchen, 6 Ill. App. 621 (1880).
60 Starne v. Farr, 17 Ill. App. 491 (1885).
58
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for some reason would not consent to serve as such61 in the role of
a defendant 2 provided appropriate allegation was made to support such action. Further evidence of liberality with respect to
equity procedure as it related to parties, in contrast to the rigidity
found in law actions, may be noted in such developments as the
representative, or class, suit6 with the attendant right of other
persons, whether so represented or not, to participate in the
proceeding by intervention," and the peculiarly equitable proceeding known as interpleader 5 Even more remarkable was the
practice which developed whenever the fault of nonjoinder existed. Instead of dismissing the suit and requiring the purchase
of a new writ, as was the case at law, the chancellor merely
directed that the necessary parties be added and, when they had
been brought in, the ease proceeded to completion.6"
The ability of a complainant to expand the scope of an
equity proceeding to permit the adjustment of more than one
equitable claim therein, while not hedged around with limitations
of the type imposed in law suits, was not without restraint for
an objection might be interposed if the bill of complaint could
be said to be multifarious in character 6 7 This objection, which
included a protest based upon an improper multiplicity of parties
61 The refusal to join as complainant might spring from a desire to avoid liability
for costs, in the event the suit should prove to be unsuccessful, or be dictated by
indifference or even opposition to the contentions advanced by the person instituting
the suit. In the last mentioned instance, a suit at law would have been stymied by
the refusal to participate or give consent to the use of the objector's name, except
where such person was no more than a nominal plaintiff. In general, see Foreman
Shoe Co. v. Lewis & Co., 191 Ill. 155, 60 N. E. 971 (1901).
62 Sapp v. Phelps, 92 Ill. 588 at 595 (1879) ; Prindeville v. Curran, 156 Ill. App.
278 (1910).
63 No attempt has been made to amplify on this and the points mentioned in the
next two succeeding footnotes. In general, see Clephane, op. cit., pp. 43-6; Clark,
Code Pleading (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1947), 2d Ed., pp. 396-408; and the
case of Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858, 20 L. R. A. 247 (1893).
64 Miller v. Clark, 301 I1. 273, 133 N. E. 685 (1922) ; Clark, op. cit., pp. 420-7.
65 Clark, op. cit., pp. 427-33. Any investigation into the Illinois law on the subject should commence with the decision in the case of Morrill v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 260, 55 N. E. 656 (1899).
66 Nolan v. Barnes, 268 Il. 515, 109 N. E. 316 (1915).
67 See, for example, Burnett v. Lester, 53 Ill. 325 (1870), wherein a legatee under
a will sought, by one bill of complaint, to restrain the widow, who was entitled
to a life estate, from committing waste and also sought to obtain partition of the
land as against the other heirs. See also Whiteside County v. Burchell, 31 Ill. 68

(1863).
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on either side of the case, stemmed from the fact that, if several
matters entirely distinct and independent of each other were
combined, the defendant might be compelled to unite wholly unconnected defenses in the answer, with the result that delays
might be occasioned or the burden of costs increased as the
unrelated claims were being considered. Since the basic factor
to be considered was one of convenience in the administration
of justice, no hard and fast rule developed by which it would
be possible to ascertain whether multifariousness was present
and the matter was generally left to the discretion of the chancellor." It was possible, therefore, for a single complainant to
institute a proceeding to set aside a family settlement allegedly
procured by fraud and then, following recission, to be allowed
to contest a will and procure partition of lands in the event
the will was nullified. 69 In the same way, a group of complainants
might join their several separate claims in one bill of complaint,
as where the owners of distinct parcels of land united to enjoin
a common nuisance being committed against them by the same
defendant or defendants.70 Conversely, it might have been considered objectionable for several grantors, each of whom had
conveyed by separate deed, to unite in one suit for recission even
though the one common grantee had perpetrated the same fraud
on all. 71 Even so, the objection generally had to be taken at the

outset for, if not then raised, it would be deemed waived.72 If
properly raised, the misjoined parties were dismissed or the
improperly included claims were stricken without prejudice and
the case then proceeded as to the remaining parties or claims. 73
Even more remarkable was the liberality shown with respect
to the opportunity given to a defendant to expand the scope of
the proceeding by the interposition of claims held by him, both
68 Abbott v. Loving, 303 Ill. 154 at 161-2, 135 N. E. 442 at 445 (1922).
69 Stephens v. Collison, 249 Ill. 225, 94 N. E. 664 (1911).
70 Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 I1. 401, 45 N. E. 236 (1896).
71 Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174 (1882).
72 Stookey v. Carter, 92 Ill. 129 (1879); Henderson v. Cummings, 44 Il.

(1867).
73 Daniel Boone Woolen Mills v. Laedeke, 238 I1. App. 92 (1925).
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against those already in the suit, whether complainants or codefendants, or against those who could be brought before the
court as additional parties. Since a defensive answer would
serve merely as a shield and, would gain no affirmative relief
for the person using the same,74 equity provided the cross-bill
as the means by which affirmative relief could be secured at the
instance of the defendant. Where, for example, a suit to construe
a will had been instituted by certain of the devisees against others
named in the same will, a defendant to the proceeding would be
entitled to use a cross-bill if he desired to secure specific performance of a contract to convey certain of the lands passing
under the will in question." The new facts so set up, of course,
had to be such, and only such, as would be needed for the court
considering the case to do full and complete justice between the
parties with reference to the subject matter and questions raised
by the original bill, hence it was made a requirement that the
new matter be germane to the original proceeding 6 and be of
such character that it would be appropriate to grant equitable
77
relief thereon.
While some doubt has been cast on the right of a defendant,
when using a cross-bill, to bring additional parties into the
litigation, 78 the better view would seem to be that, if such parties
were needed and provided they fell within the framework mentioned above in relation to original parties to an equitable proceeding, the addition of such parties would be both proper and
desirable. 79 These parties, in turn, when brought in under
74 If an answer would be sufficient for the purpose, the defendant was denied the
right to use a cross-bill: Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 95 N. E. 345, 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1158 (1911).
75 Daly v. Daly, 299 Ill. 268, 132 N. E. 495 (1921).
76 Hutson v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376, 105 N. E. 343, Ann. Cas. 1915C 587 (1914).
77 Jones v. Smith, 14 Ill. 229 (1852).
78 In
Shields v. Barrow, 58 U. S. (17 How.) 130 at 145, 15 L. Ed. 158 at 163
(1855), Mr. Justice Curtis, by way of dictum, said: "New parties cannot be introduced into a cause by a cross-bill . . . If the interest of the defendant requires their
presence, he takes the objection of nonjoinder, and the complainant is forced to
amend, or his bill is dismissed."
79 Hutson v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376 at 392, 105 N. E. 343 at 350, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 587
(1914).
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machinery provided for the purpose, 0 were likewise allowed to
interpose cross-bills in their own behalf in the event they too
possessed claims which should be thrashed out in order that
essential justice be done. 8 ' This procedure was also followed
with respect to one who was permitted to become a party to the
2
proceeding by intervention.
In the light of what has been said, it can be seen that a
proceeding in equity could be made the vehicle for the disposition
of more competing claims as between a wider variety of parties
than was, the case with respect to a suit a law. Even so, none of
the points established could prove to be helpful to support the
holding achieved in the case of Johnson v. Moon 3 for the problem there concerned grew out of a series of legal rather than
equitable claims, each of which were separate and distinct from
the others albeit they all arose at the one time and from
a common occurrence. Prior to 1933, the date of the adoption
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 4 therefore, the result attained
in that case would have been regarded as an unjustified and
unthinkable tampering with procedural machinery. The question remains, however, as to whether or not anything in the
present practice statute supports the innovation so accomplished.
III.

MODERN ILLINOIS PRACTICB

While the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933
could be said to represent a response to a wide-spread recognition of a need for revising the procedural machinery of the
state, it was made apparent, right at the start, that the statute
was not intended to be a complete codification of the subject
nor was it a substitute designed to displace all prior concepts.
80 Leave to file a cross-bill was not needed: Inter-State Building Ass'n v. Ayers,
177 Il. 9, 52 N. E. 342 (1898). Upon the filing thereof, however, additional process
would be needed, particularly where new parties were added: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931,
Ch. 22, § 31 and § 34.
81 Semble: Michael v. Mace, 137
82 Dickerman v. Northern Trust
(1900), affirming 80 F. 450 (1897).
833 I1. (2d) 561, 121 N. E. (2d)
84 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch.

Ill. 485, 27 N. E. 694 (1891).
Co., 176 U. S. 181, 20 S. Ct. 311, 44 L. Ed. 423
774 (1954).
110, § 125 et seq.
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In fact, the opening section thereof declares that, except as to
matters regulated by the statute or by rule of court, the "practice
at common law and in equity shall prevail." 8 5 There is enough
in the statute, however, to disclose a design to produce an extensive liberalization in the matter of joinder of parties and causes
so as to make the present procedural rules, and the results which
may be attained thereunder, far different from what might
previously have been possible. 86
Although no direct change was made in matters regulating
7
the right of a particular person to be the plaintiff in a suit, it
may be noted that the present provision authorizing a single
8 8 to combine,
plaintiff
if he should so wish, "any causes of action,
whether legal or equitable or both," against a defendant, or
defendants, was made subject to a qualification which permitted
the court, in the interest of convenience, to exercise discretion on
the point of whether or not to hear the combined claims at one
time or to direct that separate trials be had. 9 In much the same
85 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 125. This language has been carried forward in the proposed
amendments and additions to the statute: Tentative Final Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1954),
p. 1.
86 Reference to parties to litigation appears in Sections 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 16, 21-29a,
32-3, 38, 43-4, 46, 48, 50-1, 54, and 571 of the Civil Practice Act, but not all of these
provisions are pertinent to the matter at hand. See also Illinois Supreme Court
Rules 2 and 11: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 259.2 and 259.11.
87 The Illinois statute does not contain a "real party In interest" provision. Attention is directed, however, to the case of Gordon v. Conlon Corp., 323 Ill. App.
380, 55 N. E. (2d) 821 (1944), noted in 23 C:ICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW 185, which
deals with the effect of a "no action" clause on the right of a holder of bonds,
secured by trust deed, to sue at law to recover the unpaid amount due thereon.
See also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Chief Wash Co., 368 Ill. 146, 13 N. E. (2d)
153 (1938), on the point of the right of a trustee under a bond issue to institute
foreclosure proceedings even in the absence of a direction from the bond holders.
The case of Liberty National Bank v. Kosterlitz, 329 Ill. App. 244, 67 N. E. (2d) 876
(1946), noted in 25 CRICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 176, suggests some difficulties which
may have to be overcome before either the trustee or the beneficiary under a land
trust may be entitled to act as plaintiff in a forcible entry and detainer -proceeding.
See also Miller v. First Granite City Nat. Bank, 349 Ill. App. 347, 110 N. E. (2d)
651 (1953), on the point of the right of certain members of an unincorporated
union to join as plaintiffs in a suit at law to recover assets belonging to the union.
88 For this purpose, multiple parties seeking to enforce a joint right, or claims
against those jointly liable, are to be dealt with no differently than would have
been the case under the prior practice illustrated in Page v. Brant, 18 Ill. 37
(1856). But see Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ill. 370, 74 N. E. (2d) 489 (1947), to the
effect that a failure to make a prompt objection as to nonjoinder may result In a
waiver of the error.
89 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 168. See also Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59,
63 N. E. (2d) 768 (1945) ; State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 372 Ill. 114, 22 N. E.
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way, as between the original parties, the defendant was clearly
empowered, but not required, to offer a counterclaim, which
counterclaim could take the form of set-off, recoupment, or crossbill in equity, but could deviate from either since it might extend
to claims arising in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated
damages, or for other relief. 90 It is clear, then, that it was the
intention of the framers of the statute that, once a plaintiff undertook suit, the door could be thrown wide open to the adjustment
of any and all difficulties which beset the original parties if that
should be their wish. Old limitations respecting the writ system
with its insistence that only like claims should be combined,9 1
or which existed because, at one time, law suits and equity proceedings were heard before distinctly separated courts, went by
the board, as was also true with respect to the confining restrictions which hampered a defendant from using, to the fullest
92
advantage, his claims against the plaintiff.
In much the same way, wide latitude was granted to permit
persons having distinct but related claims to join in one suit,
as plaintiffs, or be combined therein, as defendants, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, provided some nexus
existed sufficient to justify the inclusion of the multiple litigants
in the one case.93 In that connection, the new practice was
designed to adopt the equitable principle which permitted the
inclusion of a party as a defendant in the event, being a necessary
party to the cause, he refused to permit the use of his name on
a more appropriate side of the case,9 4 and the statute also declared
that faults arising from nonjoinder or misjoinder should not
(2d) 941 (1939) ; Illinois Mineral Co. v. Miller, 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N. E. (2d) 44
(1946) ; People for use of Pope County v. Shetler, 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N. E. (2d)
732 (1943).
90 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 162(1).
91 See notes 31-8, ante.
92 See notes 39-46 and 74-82, ante.
93 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 147-8.
94 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 147. But see Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill.
291, 83 N. E. (2d) 714 (1949), to the effect that this section is applicable only
where joint plaintiffs are necessary parties and that there is no authority thereunder to "allow an Improper plaintiff to start a suit by making the sole necessary
plaintiff a party defendant." 402 Ill. 291 at 300, 83 N. E. (2d) 714 at 719.
Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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require dismissal of the suit, as was once the case at law, but
could be cured by the addition of new parties or the dismissal
of misjoinded parties as the ends of justice might require. 5
These sections have, in the main, presented very little difficulty although, in the years which have intervened since the
Civil Practice Act was adopted, a number of cases have arisen
to illustrate the several points involved. Insofar as suits at law
have been concerned, old principles have controlled with respect
to the obligation of joint claimants to combine as joint plaintiff s96
and there has been no change in the right to name defendants
as joint tort feasors for the purpose of bringing them together
in one suit.9" Older practices have yielded, however, so as to
permit a combination of tort and contract claims9" and even
legal and equitable claims99 in the one suit as between the same
parties where, before this, separate suits would have been required.
The most outstanding change in procedure in law suits has
been in the direction of permitting the combination in one suit
95 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 150. Machinery for the addition of new parties, when needed,
is provided by ibid., § 149. The duty of a trial court to enforce this provision is
illustrated in Bobzien v. Schwartz, 289 Ill. App. 299, 7 N. ]. (2d) 362 (1937). See
also People for use of Pope County v. Shetler, 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N. E. (2d) 732
(1943).
96 American Transp. Co. v. U. S. Sanitary Specialties Corp., 2 Ill. App. (2d) 144,
118 N. E. (2d) 793 (1954), wherein co-lessees joined in a suit for damage done to
the demised premises; Illinois Mineral Co. v. Miller, 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N. E. (2d)
44 (1946) ; Winn v. Underwood, 325 Ill. App. 297, 60 N. E. (2d) 116 (1945), a suit
in trespass by the owners of the realty invaded.
97 The cases of Minnis v. Friend, 360 Ill. 328, 196 N. E. 191 (1935), and Aarseth
v. Stein, 278 Ill. App. 16 (1934), noted in 13 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 165, will
serve as illustrations. Attention is, however, directed to the cases of Stoewsand v.
Checker Taxi Co., 331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N. E. (2d) 4 (1947), and Shaw v. Courtney,
317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E. (2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvgw
249, affirmed in 385 Ill. 559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944), for the bearing they possess
on the question as to the form of judgment which should be rendered against the
defendants so combined.
98 People for use of Jones v. Leviton, 327 Ill. App. 309, 64 N. E. (2d) 195 (1946).
It was indicated therein that separate counts would be desirable since the claim
against the principal obligor was in tort for malicious abuse of process, whereas
the claim against the surety on the bond rested in contract. See also Wattman v.
St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 II. App. 244, 41 N. E. (2d) 314 (1942).
99 Illinois Mineral Co. v. Miller, 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N. E. (2d) 44 (1946);
Borman v. Oetzell, 382 Ill. 110, 46 N. E. (2d) 914 (1943). In the last-mentioned
case, the court indicated there was no basis for an objection to the joinder of the
claims but did note that its own jurisdiction to entertain an appeal had not
been expanded by the combination of the claims in one suit.
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of a number of plaintiffs whose claims have arisen from a common
transaction or the like, even though each possessed a separate
and distinct legal claim, who would, heretofore, have been required
to use a series of independent law actions.' In much the same
way, it has become possible to bring a number of defendants
together in one suit who, under the former practice, would have
been in a position to complain of a misjoinder because they owed
The defendants so joined have
separate and distinct duties.'
been held on their independent liabilities3 or again, at times,
have been subjected to liability in the alternative,4 a situation
unheard of under the common law scheme. Except as to the
matter of counterclaim practice, discussed hereafter, the only
other noteworthy development has been one by which it is now
possible to consider equitable issues in common law suits. 5
Proceedings in equity have, in the main, been conducted along
the lines of the former practice at least insofar as the doctrines
concerning parties have been concerned. It has, for example,
1 Antosz v. Goss Motors, Inc., 378 Ill. 608, 39 N. E. (2d) 322 (1942) ; Shelton v.
Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N. E. (2d) 697 (1946) ; Weigend v. Hulsh, 315 Ill. App.
116, 42 N. E. (2d) 146 (1.942): Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N. E.
(2d) 228 (1939) ; Schultz v. Gilbert, 300 Ill. App. 417, 20 N. E. (2d) 884 (1939)
Crane v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 328, 12 N. E. (2d) 672 (1938)
Hitchcock v. Reynolds, 278 Ill. App. 559 (1935).
The defendants
2 People v. Roth, Inc., 412 Ill. 446, 107 N. E. (2d) 692 (1952).
there were sued as joint tort feasors but the court decided the liability of the
defendants was essentially separate and distinct. See also Borman v. Oetzell, 382
111. 110, 46 N. E. (2d) 914 (1943) ; People for use of Jones v. Leviton, 327 Ill. App.
309, 64 N. E. (2d) 195 (1946) ; People for use of Pope County v. Shetler, 318 Ill.
App. 279, 47 N. E. (2d) 732 (1943); Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314
Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. (2d) 314 (1942).
3 In addition to the cases cited in the preceding footnote, see Shelton v. Barry,
328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N. E. (2d) 697 (1946). But see Winn v. Underwood, 325 Ill.
App. 297, 60 N. E. (2d) 116 (1945), as to the necessity for a separate count to
assert the liability of an heir at law to respond out of property inherited for a tort
committed by the ancestor even though the latter had acted jointly with others.
See also the doubtful holding in Shaw v. Courtney, 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E. (2d)
170 (1943), criticized in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 249, affirmed in 385 Ill.
559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944).
4 American Transp. Co. v. U. S. Sanitary Specialties Corp., 2 Ill. App. (2d) 144,
118 N. E. (2d) 793 (1954) ; Lustig v. Hutchinson, 349 Ill. App. 120, 110 N. E. (2d)
278

(1953),

noted in
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275; Cook-Master,

Inc. v.

Nicro Steel Products, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 519, 90 N. E. (2d) 657 (1950). The use of
alternative counts against different defendants in quo warranto was approved in
People ex rel. Ray v. Lewistown School District, 388 111. 78, 57 N. E. (2d) 486
(1944).
5 Horner v. Jamieson, 394 Ill. 222, 68 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGOKENT LAw REVIEW 232.
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been emphasized that a beneficiary under a land trust would be
an essential party to a suit to set aside or cancel the trust agreenent as no decree affecting the beneficiary's interest in the
property could be entered without his presence.6 Except as
noted above, 7 the rule still prevails that one who should appear
as a plaintiff may be made a defendant if that should be necessary to get him before the court.' Former principles controlling
the right to conduct a class or representative suit,9 with respect
to intervention," and concerning interpleader," have naturally
gone unchanged since the Civil Practice Act is silent in relation
thereto. 12 For that matter, the jurisdiction exercised by courts
of equity remains the same' 3 even though it might now be pos6 Ylonen v. Ylonen, 2 Ii1. (2d) 111, 117 N. E. (2d) 98 (19.54).
7 Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 I1. 291, 83 N. E. (2d) 714 (1949).
See note 94, ante.
8 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 147.
9 Recent cases include State Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 301,
68 N. E. (2d) 525 -(1946) : The Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85,
55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 82; Peoples Store
of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N. E. (2d) 995 (1942)
Burke v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co.. 348 111. App. 529, 109 N. E. (2d) 358 (1952) Rubloff & Co. v.
Leaf, 347 Ii1. App. 191, 106 N. E. (2d) 735 (1952) ; Kimbrough v. Parker. 344 Il.
App. 483, 101 N. E. (2d) 617 (1951) ; Brooks v. Saloy, 334 Ill. App. 93, 79 N. E.
(2d) 97 (1948); Rinn v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bank, 326 Ill. App. 376, 62
N. E. (2d) 8 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 188; Hintze v. Allen.
326 Ill. App. 182, 61 N. E. (2d) 259 (1945) ; Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill.
App. 135, 35 N. E. (2d) 545 (1941).
10 A full discussion of this point appears in Hairgrove v. City of Jacksonville, 366
Il. 1(3, 8 N. E. (2d) 187 (1937). But see also Kronan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Medeck. 368 11. 118. 13 N. E. (2d) 66 (1938). noted in 16 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvlE W 279; Strader v. Board of Education, 351 Ill. App. 438, 115 N. E. (2d) 539
(1953); Korngabiel v. Fish, 313 Ill. App. 286, 40 N. E. (2d) 314 (1942), noted in
20 CHICA0o-KENT LAw REvmw 354.

11 City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunham, 306 Il. App. 354, 28 N. E. (2d) 812
(140): Hatzenbuhler v. Modern Woodmen of America, 305 Ill. App. 501, 27 N. E.
(2d) 563 (1940). For the right to use a counterclaim for interpleader purposes,
see Curran v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank. 348 Ill. App. 210, 108 N. E. (2d) 729
(1952).
12 Proposals have been made to add specific provisions to the Civil Practice Act
with respect to intervention and interpleader: Tentative Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1954), pp.
3943.
13 It should be noted that courts of equity, when exercising statutory jurisdiction
in matters relating to divorce and separate maintenance, are subject to certain
limitations. Property rights between the spouses may be adjusted at the time an
absolute divorce is granted, either as an incident thereto or on special allegation,
Ylonen v. Ylonen, 2 Ill. (2d) 111. 117 N. E. (2d) 98 (1954), and Hitchcock v.
Hitchcoc.k. 373 ill. 352. 26 N. E. (2d) 108 (1940), but may not be determined. even
under a counterclaim, independently of a divorce: Klajbor v. Klajbor, 398 Il1. 152,
75 N. E. (2d) 353 (1947). The jurisdiction in separate maintenance matters
appears to be even more limited: Petta v. Petta, 321 111. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d)
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sible to accomplish some things at law which were not previously
there possible. 4
The subject of the right of a plaintiff, or plaintiffs, to combine a series of separate equitable claims in one equitable proceeding has also been given some attention by the courts. As
might be expected, no multifariousness was found present in a
suit to establish the existence of a prior mutual will and, at the
same time, to nullify a later will by the same testator because of
alleged undue influence, inasmuch as a determination of the one
point was essential to a decision on the other." For that matter,
no objection was voiced to a proceeding by interested parties
designed to set aside a will and also to have the deceased testator's marriage declared void for lack of mental capacity, 1" and
none could reasonably have been advanced because of the similarity in the issues involved. The Appellate Court decision in
the case of Gombie v. Taylor Washing Machine Company,17 however, seemed to keep older ideas on the point alive, at least for
a while, for it was there held that it would be multifarious for
a number of separate plaintiffs to combine in one equitable proceeding, even though each sought the same general type of relief
against the one common defendant, because the joinder provisions of the statute were there said to have been intended to do
no more than change the rules as to law actions. Fortunately, the
views there expressed were disregarded in two later cases wherein
324 (1944). noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 281. The court there indicated
that its prior holding in Glennon v. Glennon, 299 Ill. App. 13, 19 N. E. (2d) 412
(1939), was erroneous.
14 In Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N. E. (2d) 420
(1935), an insured was permitted, In an equitable proceeding, to combine claims
against sixteen insurers who had issued a total of nineteen policies in an effort to
ascertain the extent of the loss and to apportion the liability between the several
insurers on the familiar principle that equity would take jurisdiction to avoid a
multiplicity of suits. Views expressed therein were followed in the case of Jay-Bee
Realty Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 320 Ill. App. 310, 50 N. E. (2d) 973 (1943),
despite the objection that the plaintiff, in a similar case, bad an adequate remedy
at law as it was possible, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 148, to
combine the several insurers in one suit at law on the theory the several claims
arose from the one common fire.
15 Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N. E. (2d) 768 (1945).
16 Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N. E. (2d) 91 (1940).
17290 Ill. App. 53, 7 N. E. (2d) 929 (1937), noted in 15 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Im-iEw 303.
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multiple plaintiffs were permitted to combine to obtain identical,
albeit individual, relief inasmuch as the several claims so combined arose from a common situation1 8 or grew out of the same
general type of fraud and oppression. 19 It could be said that
these last-mentioned decisions represent the preferred view on
the subject for the combination of parties minimized expense and
subserved the convenience of both courts and litigants.
The counterclaim provision of the Civil Practice Act 20 appears
to have been utilized quite freely both at law and in equity but,
until the holding in the Johnson case, every point made thereunder was one which flowed from former ideas concerning the
right of a defendant to turn the suit against him into an attack
upon the plaintiff or else rested squarely on statutory innovations.
It might be noted, at the outset, that the statute was intended to
obviate some but not all of the former distinctions so no surprise
should be occasioned by the fact that a legal counterclaim has
been enforced in an equitable proceeding2 1 and has been permitted
as against a co-defendant already in the suit2 2 but has been denied
IS In Village of Melrose Park v. Prairie State Bank, 330 Ill. App. 18, 69 N. E.
(2d) 729 (1946), an unspecified number of plaintiffs were permitted to combine, so
as to avoid a multiplicity of suits, for the purpose of restraining the enforcement
of 21 judgments taken by confession, and the threat to institute 16 additional
actions. growing out of a banking transaction tnder which a village had endeavored
to finance the payment of salaries due to its unpaid employees. No mention was
made therein of the decision in the Gombie case.
19 The case of Van Kleeck v. Vente. 340 111. App. 395, 91 N. E. (2d) 908 (1950),
seems to indicate that it would be proper for an unspecified number of plaintiffs
to combine in one suit against a common defendant, operating a dancing school and
also a collection agency, to restrain the enforcement of a series of independent
notes given pursuant to separate contracts for dancing lessons. It should be noted,
however, that the matter arose on an appeal from a temporary injunction and the
defendant did not appear to have raised any issue with respect to a possible
misjoinder.
20 Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162.
21 People ex rel. Bradford Supply Co. v. Circuit Court, 393 Ill. 520, 66 N. E. (2d)
420 (1946)
State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 372 Ill. 114, 22 N. E. (2d) 941
(1939), noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 291. But see the case of Sauvage
v. Oscar W. Hedstrom Corp., 322 Ill. App. 427, 54 N. E. (2d) 725 (1944), to the
effect that a counterclaim for money due on an account stated may not be used in
a forcible detainer action because of the limited scope of the last-named statutory
remedy, despite a provision in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11, making the
procedure under the Civil Practice Act applicable to suits of that character.
22 People ex rel. Ames v. Marx, 299 Ill. App. 284, 20 N. E. (2d) 103 (1939). It
should be noted that the co-defendant therein, being the principal obligor on a
bond given to guarantee payment of taxes collected, raised no protest to a counterclaim by the defendant surety for indemnity in the event the surety was obliged to
pay the obligee. At common law, a separate suit would have been required as the
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on a claim barred before the counterclaim was filed 28 or has been
stricken where the claim relied on had not matured at the time
the counterclaim was interposed.24 Naturally, therefore, a counterclaim would not be needed today, any more than in the past, if
the defendant can accomplish his purpose by a defensive answer 25
but one would be required if some form of affirmative relief is
needed 26 unless the person against whom it should be offered fails
to raise an objection that a defensive answer alone is insufficient
for the purpose.2 7 Not being limited in scope to either recoupment, set-off, or cross-bill in equity, the counterclaim may be
used in situations where neither of its progenitors would have
been permitted 2s but care must be taken to see to it that, if separate judgments are rendered, 9 the enforcement thereof must
surety was not entitled to reimbursement until he had paid, or at least partly paid,
the principal obligor's debt for him.
23 In Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 89 N. E. (2d) 23 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGOKENT LAw REvIEw 274, a suit for wrongful death was instituted by the legal representative of one person's estate against the legal representative of another who
had been killed in the same collision. The defendant, within what would ordinarily
be an appropriate time, filed a counterclaim for wrongful death but the same was
actually filed more than one year after the death occurred for which reason the
counterclaim was ordered stricken. Careful attention should be given to the fact
that the one-year period specified in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, operates
as a condition precedent and is not to be confused with the typical limitation
provision. On the latter point, see ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 18.
24 See Biedler v. Malz, 323 Ill. App. 265, 55 N. E. (2d) 300 (1944), to the effect
that a counterclaim for malicious abuse of process in suing out a writ of attachment may not be interposed in a pending attachment proceeding because, from the
nature thereof, no claim could arise until the termination of the attachment proceeding in favor of the defendant-counterclaimant.
25 Trapp v. Gordon, 366 Ill. 102, 7 N. E. (2d) 869 (1937).
26 State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 372 Ill. 114, 22 N. E. (2d) 941 (1939),
noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 291; Warren v. McRoberts, 315 Ill. App.
499, 43 N. H. (2d) 401 (1942). In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Herlin, 299 Ill.
App. 429, 20 N. E. (2d) 333 (1939), the court said that a defendant "who desires
affirmative relief against a co-defendant on a matter germane to the Issue presented
by the complaint, is required to file a counterclaim, and cannot secure such relief
on an answer filed to plaintiff's complaint. Any other rule would be fraught with
great danger of injustice." 299 Ill. App. 429 at 436, 20 N. E. (2d) 333 at 336.
27 Pliley v. Phifer, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 398, 117 N. H. (2d) 678 (1954).
28 In the case of Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 69 N. E. (2d) 862 (1946), a suit
to secure the construction of a will and, thereafter, for the partition of real estate,
a counterclaim by one of the defendants to establish a constructive trust in his
favor as to certain personalty was upheld, despite the former rule which prohibited
the interposition of a cross-bill in a partition action with reference to other property than that over which partition was sought. See also People ex rel. Bradford
Supply Co. v. Circuit Court, 393 Ill. 520, 66 N. E. (2d) 420 (1946).
29 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174, permits the rendition of more than
one judgment in a proceeding but adds the limitation that, in case a counterclaim
is filed. "no execution shall be issued until all the issues in the case have been
determined," except on special leave of court.
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be stayed to await the outcome of the other claims involved in
the suit. 0
In all of the instances mentioned, the counterclains ran
between parties to the original proceeding so, until fairly recently,
no Illinois court had been asked to pass on the question as to
whether or not it would be possible, by means of a counterclaim,
to add new parties to the suit.8 ' The issue first arose in the case
of Curran v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank32 wherein the bank,
upon suit against it by one of its depositors and following demands made upon it by third persons who claimed the same
fund, offered a counterclaim in the nature of interpleader, naming
the plaintiff and the third persons as counter-defendants. After
steps had been taken to bring the third persons into the suit, "
one of such persons moved to strike the counterclaim for an
alleged misjoinder but this motion was denied and the Appellate
Court for the First District affirmed this holding. It noted, in
that connection, that a strict, literal interpretation of the counterclaim provision appeared to justify the objection since the relief
sought was not claimed solely against the plaintiff or against a
co-defendant already in the proceeding, but it pointed to the fact
that Section 25 of the Civil Practice Act, borrowed from Section
34 of the former Chancery Act,8 4 was designed to continue the
former equity practice as to cross-bills, under which practice it
had been possible to bring new parties into the case wherever
their presence was needed for a complete determination of the
controversy. 5 As the counterclaim in question was modelled on
30 State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 372 Ill. 114, 22 N. E. (2d) 941 (1939), noted
in

18 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 291.

81 The original draft of the Civil Practice Act included a provision for what is

commonly designated as third-party practice, but it was deleted by the legislature:
43 Ill. L. Rev. 41 at 59-60. Such practice exists in the Municipal Court of Chicago
by virtue of its Rule 25, comparable to Fed. Rule 14. For cases illustrating the
procedure thereunder, see Western Contractors Supply Co. v. T. P. Dowdle Co., 346
Ill. App. 17, 104 N. E. (2d) 642 (1952) ; Hillman v. Kropp Forge Co., 340 Ill. App.

606, 92 N. E. (2d) 537 (1950); Jones v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 282 InI.
App. 131 (1935). A third-party practice provision has been included in the proposed
revision of the statute: Tentative Draft, pp. 35-7.
32348

IlI.

App. 210, 108 N. E. (2d) 729 (1952).

See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 34.
35 The former practice is illustrated in Hutson v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376, 105 N. E.
343, Ann. Cas. 1915C 587 (1914).
88
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the lines of a former cross-bill in equity, 6 the court correctly took
the position that it would be a "travesty on justice" to say that
the counterclaim provision, despite its seeming liberality, had
actually lessened the ability of a court to administer justice by
placing hampering restrictions on the right to compel the addition
of necessary parties.
No one would care to criticize the holding in the Curran case,
but it does not follow that the views there expressed, appropriate
as they may be with respect to matters of equitable cognizance,
are equally hue as to counterclaims offered in legal proceedings,
particularly when the counterclaims so offered rest on purely
legal grounds. It is certain that nothing like the action there
taken would have been tolerated in a common law court and it
is extremely doubtful whether the legislature intended to so far
assimilate practice at law and in equity as to permit the procedural
devices of the one to carry over into the other. If views expressed
outside of Illinois are of any value, attention might be drawn to
holdings achieved elsewhere. In the Oregon case of Continental
37
Guaranty Corporation v. Chrisman,
for example, a sheriff was
sued at law by an unsatisfied creditor for having negligently
failed to execute a writ of attachment and, in that suit, the sheriff
offered a counterclaim as in equity to secure reformation of a
forthcoming bond given to prevent the attachment which, he
claimed, had been incorrectly signed and attested by the sureties
thereon but had been given with intent to bind the sureties. After
the sureties had been added to the case over their objection, the
original plaintiff offered an amended complaint directed against
the sheriff and the sureties, in the alternative, and secured judgment against the latter only. This judgment was reversed when
the Oregon court, despite a local provision for the bringing in of
new parties for the purpose of securing a "complete determination of the controversy," held that the "controversy" was limited
to the action pending before the court when the motion to add
36 See Edwards v. Hudson, 165 Ill. App. 521 (1911), on the point of the right of a
defendant, when sued in equity, to use a cross-bill for interpleader purposes.
37 134 Ore. 524, 294 P. 596 (1930).
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additional parties was filed, that is the claim of neglect on the
part of the sheriff. The court said the plaintiff had the right, if
he preferred, to rest his case on that charge and to ignore other
possibilities but, when he had made his choice, he was confined
to the controversy so selected and could investigate that question
and that question only. As the sureties on the forthcoming bond
were not concerned with that particular claim, the cross-complaint
as to them, together with the amended pleadings resting thereon,
88
were ordered stricken.
None of the aforementioned matters are of direct help in resolving the problems to be found in the situation involved in
Johnson v. Moon. The decision therein, in effect, gives to a person named as defendant the right to use a counterclaim which is
essentially similar to the former cross-bill in equity but with the
important modification that it may be based upon purely legal
demands and may be used as a vehicle to add new parties to law
suits. The nub of the matter rests in the meaning to be ascribed
to language contained in Section 38 of the Civil Practice Act39
for, once the meaning thereof is determined, the mechanics for
the addition of new parties, if new parties are needed, is clearly
adequate.40 Admitting that the counterclaim section specifies no
restraint upon the nature of the demands which may be asserted
thereunder, 41 it does contain the important qualification that the
demand be one "by one or more defendants" and be directed
38 See also Alpers v. Bliss, 145 Cal. 565, 79 P. 171 (1904) ; Lowndes v. City Nat.
Bank. 79 Conn. 693, 66 A. 514 (1907) ; Brush v. Levy, 54 App. Div. 296, 66 N. Y. S.
700 (1900) ; Taylor v. Matteson, 86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W. 829 (1893) ; and note in 23
Col. L. Rev. 638. Contra: Davies v. Lutz, 105 Kan. 531, 185 P. 45 (1919).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162.
40 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 149. The phrase "complete determination of the controversy"
used therein to serve as a test for ascertaining whether additional parties would be
needed now shifts in meaning from prior concepts developed in law and equity to
that dictated by the definition to be given to the word "controversy," as noted
hereafter. It was once thought that this section was intended to obviate the common law rule which required the dismissal of a suit where a misjoinder or nonjoinder had occurred, Zukowski v. Armour, 107 Ill. App. 663 (1903), by substituting
the equity practice on the point: Hinton. Illinois Civil Practice Act (University of
Chicago, 1934), pp. 173-9 and 195-6. The late professor McCaskill's ideas on the
point appear to be something of an after-thought. Compare Illinois Civil Practice
Act Annotated. p. 51, with the 1936 Supplement, pp. 57-60.
41 The text thereof refers to "any demand . . . whether in the nature of set-off,
recoupment, cross-bill in equity or otherwise." Italics added.
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against "one or more plaintiffs" or "against one or more codefendants."
A critic would have to be captious to argue that a counterclaim
directed against a plaintiff and a co-defendant would be open to
objection, for the placing of an irrational emphasis on the word
"or" would lead to a restriction not previously imposed in suits
arising in equity, the administrative standards of which have,
in general, been the procedural guide. It is not possible, however,
to gloss so lightly over the terms "plaintiffs" and "co-defendants" as used in the statute for they are terms possessed of a
well-defined meaning and would, normally, be regarded as applicable only to persons already in a case, that is those named, or
who should have been named, as necessary parties in the original
complaint. 42 In effect, therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has
construed the counterclaim provision as if it sanctioned the use
of a counterclaim in all cases, not only against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more co-defendants, but also "against
one or more persons who may thereafter properly be added as
parties to the litigation."
By so doing, however, it has tended to create confusion in
another direction. The old equity requirement that the cross-bill
had to be "germane" to the issues set up in the original bill of
complaint 43 was seemingly dropped when, both with respect to
joinder of claims and defenses 44 and with regard to counterclaims
existing between the original parties, 45 the need for relevancy between the several matters asserted was abandoned. Now, by the
holding in the Johnson case, the court is saying that, as between
original parties, the several issues generated by the complexity
of demand and counter-demand may be as relevant or irrelevant
as the parties may please4" but, if new parties are to be added in
42 If resort be made to third-party practice for analogy, it might be mentioned
that the person newly added to the suit by a third-party complaint is correctly
styled a "third-party defendant" and not a "co-defendant." See Fed. Rule 14.
43 See notes 76-7, ante.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 167-8.
45 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 162.
46 The only degree of control would seem to rest in the power of a trial court, in
its discretion, to order separate trials: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 147-8.
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the manner there sanctioned, the scope of the counterclaim must
be limited in subject matter to issues which are germane, i. e.,
which arise out of the same transaction, or series of transactions,
as that set out in the original complaint.
The cardinal distinction does not lie, as in the federal courts,
on whether or not the counterclaim is of the mandatory or permissive variety,4 7 for the party before the state court is left free
to choose to use a counterclaim or not as he sees fit.4 The distinction must, hereafter, rest on the point as to whether or not
the counterclaim runs between existing litigants or is directed,
at least in part, against those who must be added to the suit. If
the former, the door is wide open; if the latter, the door may
swing no wider than the definition which the court may give to
the term "controversy" as that term applies to the original
parties and fixes the measure of the suit between them.4 9
It would seem, therefore, that the bar must refresh its recollection as to the meaning of the concept of germaneness or else
work to the end of securing clarification with respect to a joinder
concept based upon a common transaction capable of giving rise
to common questions of law and fact. One thing is certain and
that is that the plaintiff no longer controls the scope of the litigation he institutes. 50 If he dares to litigate, he must expect the
consequences, even though such consequences extend to the point
47 See Fed. Rule 13.
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162. specifically says that the counterclaim "may be pleaded as a cross-demand." Italics added.
49 Some clue may be found in the fact that the court refused to define "controversy" to refer to no more than the claim asserted by the original plaintiff against
the original defendant, saying that this construction was "too narrow." It preferred to view the matter as being controlled by a single occurrence which generated common questions of law and fact and in which, if separate suits were
maintained, consolidation for trial would be proper pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 175. See 3 Il. (2d) 561 at 570, 121 N. E. (2d) 774 at 778.
50 That concept, to a large extent, disappeared with the enactment of Section 52
of the Civil Practice Act and the adoption of the limitations it imposes on the right
to seek a voluntary dismissal: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176. For an
application thereof with respect to a counterclaim, see Wilhite v. Agbayani, 2 Ill.
App. (2d) 29, 118 N. E. (2d) 440 (1950), noted in 32 CHIoAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
339.
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where he must face claims he thought were abandoned or adversaries whose very existence he may never have suspected.5 1
The key concept bearing on matters of joinder of parties and
causes has shifted, with the passage of time, from one calling for
simplicity of issues to one under which administrative convenience
is the goal to be subserved, regardless how complicated the issues
thereby may become. Even so, the ultimate in convenience will
not be reached until litigants are compelled, under penalty of bar
by reason of res judicata, to assert every possible related demand
or counterdemand in the one case. The Johnson case does not go
that far so perhaps the time is now ripe for Illinois lawyers, if
they are interested in the convenient dispatch of cases, to push
for an addition to the Illinois Civil Practice Act in the form of a
compulsory counterclaim provision modelled along federal lines.

51 The Supreme Court holding in the case of Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin
Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Iii. (2d) 273, 122 N. E. (2d) 540 (1954), affirming 351
Ill. App. 289, 114 N. E. (2d) 906 (1953), seems to be no more than part and parcel
of this idea. The court there approved a belated amendment which added a new
plaintiff to a suit on a cause which, if it had been made the basis of a separate
suit, would have clearly been barred. Compare the holding therein with the result
attained, on almost identical facts, in the case of Govedarica v. Yellow Cab Company, 216 F. (2d) 499 (1954). See also the case of Mann v. City of Chicago, 315
Ill. App. 179, 42 N. E. (2d) 862 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvm~w
100. A note in 24 CmOAe-KMT LAW REVIEW 170 discusses the problems involved
in an attempt to bring new parties defendant into a pending action after the
limitation period has expired.

